Timeout pwsafe9/19/2023 ![]() Safes are stored on Microsoft Azure Storage. Here's some extra information on the way we store and protect your data: This means even if a hacker successfully attacked us and got hold of your data, there's nothing they could do except try to brute-force your password, i.e., try all possible passwords until they find the right one. We store your safes' copies exactly the way they are stored on your device: fully encrypted by your passphrase. The solutionĬloud Backups is a cloud service which stores unlimited backups of your safes on our servers. Then, the only backup lies on your device, or on your computer if you use iTunes for syncing. It could also be that you prefer to stay away from Apple and Dropbox because of privacy concerns, and use Local safes instead. Dropbox may help with that by means of their File Versions feature, but unless you buy their Extended Version History optional add-on, there are no guarantees after 30 days. ICloud is great for syncing, but if you accidentally change your safe in an undesirable manner, there's no coming back, it only saves the two most recent versions of your safe. You can't lose your passwords, even if you make a mistake. If you have any doubts, please contact us and we'll be glad to clarify any doubts you might have on Cloud Memory. If your device is ever lost or stolen, you can open the confirmation email and click this from any computer and be assured that your passwords are secure. We even remove expired keys from our database periodically.įinally, when you register your device with pwSafe Cloud, you'll also get a link which, when clicked, immediately clears all keys for that device from our database. This also means the period of time you set is respected, because it's enforced by our always-on servers. Even if we were served a court-order asking for your safe password, we wouldn't be able to comply. This means we don't have access to your safe's password at any time. With those keys, pwSafe then unlocks your previously unlocked safes, in a seamless experience. When pwSafe is re-launched, it asks the server for the keys it has saved, and the server only includes non-expired keys back in its reply. That random key is then sent to our servers, along with its expiration date. Here's how it works:įirst, when pwSafe is closed with an open safe, it will encrypt the safe password with a freshly generated random key, and store the encrypted password on the device's Keychain. The solutionĬloud Memory is a cloud service which fixes both issues. If we could set an expiration date on a Ke圜hain password, which we currently can't, setting a very long time (in the order of days instead of minutes) on your safe would still be very insecure, because, during that period, any attacker would easily get hold of your safe's content. We could also save the encryption key and encrypted password on the device's Ke圜hain, but that would only make it harder, not impossible, for someone which got hold of your device to be able to crack your safe open even after the time you've chosen has elapsed. Of course we could encrypt your password, but pwSafe would then need to have access to the encryption key when restarting. To be able to recover it upon re-launching, pwSafe would need to save it on the device's permanent storage. ![]() When this happens to pwSafe, your safe's password is also removed from memory. The reason behind this is that, when iOS needs more memory for a foreground app, it removes backgrounded apps from memory. By design, we choose security over usability, and force your to re-enter your password when re-launching the app. This password safe docker image contains the following software components:įor data storage you will need a relational database.Even if you select a long time to keep your safe open, pwSafe isn't able to respect it. The Web Password safe docker image is based on Debian Jessie, Oracle JDK 8 and Apache Tomcat 7.
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